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BOOK REVIEWS 
Rich Relations 
David Reynolds, Ric11 Relations: 
T11e American Occupation of 
Britain, .1942-1945 (New York and 
Toronto: Random House, 1995) 
555 pages, $30. 
T his book has been much praised and deservedly so. It 
is wellwritten and well-researched. 
and mirabile dictu, it includes 
substantial material on the impact 
of the half-million Canadians who, 
along with some three million 
Americans, served time in 
Britain during the Second World 
War. 
Reynolds, a Cambridge 
University historian married to an 
American, has done extensive 
research in the British, American, 
and Canadian archives. and he has 
read widely in the secondary 
literature. The result is a detailed 
examination of the way different 
cultures dealt with each other. 
clashed or integrated, and how the 
respective bureaucracies tried to 
cope. There is even some material 
on how Canadians and Americans 
got on- badly at first but better as 
time went on, thanks, Reynolds 
opines, to the fact that Canadians 
carne to see that their British past 
was being replaced by an American 
future. He even cites Major-General 
F.F. Worthington as suggesting that 
since American equipment and 
ideas were better than those of the 
British. Canadians should try to 
serve with the U.S. forces. No 
wonder Fighting Frank had to be 
got rid of in 1 944! 
The Americans, of course, had 
special problems - black soldiers. 
for example - that the Canadians 
had and, according to 
black Gls, the Canadian Army 
handled matters much better. The 
Americans also wanted their full 
pay, better food than hungry Brttish 
civilians. and the right to try their 
soldiers in their own courts; they 
had sufficient clout to get their way 
(including food that amounted to 
three times the civilian ration). And 
the Canadians? For the most part, 
Canadians lived on the execrable 
British rations, in Britain and in 
action, part of their higher pay than 
British soldiers received was 
deferred or assigned back home, 
and the Canadian authorities went 
along with the application of British 
justice to their military miscreants. 
Reynolds notes dryly that two 
An1erieans serving in the Canadian 
Army robbed a Briton at gunpoint 
and were sentenced to 
imprisonment and the lash; the 
U.S. ambassador intervened 
successfully to have the whipping 
foregone. Too bad Ambassador 
Winant or someone wasn't there 
to assist Canadian soldiers on their 
way to Dartmoor and I or the 
Glasshouse. Essentially, the 
conclusion from this study is that 
Canada's military acted like that of 
a colonial state; the Americans 
demanded that they be treated as 
equals and were. 
In his one full chapter on the 
Canadians. ''A Day Trip to Dieppe." 
Reynolds makes the case in 
contradistinction to Desmond 
Morton and others who have 
suggested that the Canadians were 
not champing at the bit to see action 
-that morale in 1942 was such a 
serious problem that the Canadian 
commanders virtually had to get 
their troops into action. And, he 
points out, even after the August 
1942 debacle, morale rose in 
virtually all units. At last, the 
Canadians had fought. the single 
day at Dieppe helping to put an end 
to the constant carping from the 
British about how long the 
Canadians were going to sit in 
beautiful Salisbury doing nothing. 
Sex naturally enters into the 
story. and Reynolds is interesting 
here. Forty percent of Canadians 
who fell victim to venereal disease 
had had intercourse in London: 
only 30 per cent of Americans 
became infected there. (I must 
admit to being unsure what this 
means.) Eventually, the Canadian 
and American forces jointly 
persuaded the reluctant British to 
tackle the VD epidemic with a 
program of tracing sexual contacts, 
along the lines of !hose long 
employed in North America. that 
had some success. Gls. Reynolds 
also says. complained that British 
condoms were too small, 
presumably more American 
bragging: Canadians said nothing-
yet another effort by their generals 
at getting along? And there were 
more difficulties in the way of a G I 
trying to marry a British civilian 
than faced a Canadian. The result 
was more Canadian war brides 
than American, despite the much 
larger numbers of Americans 
stationed in Lhe U.K. Of course, 
Canadians were there longer. and 
briefly in 1940 and for some time 
after 1942. many were billeted on 
British civilians. That presumably 
speeded the Canadians on their way 
to ever-closer relations. Reynolds 
also notes that the arrival of 
Americans in quantity, from 1942 
on. helped ease Anglo-Canadian 
relations- the Canadians could join 
the Brits in complaining about the 
bloody Yanks! 
Still. the author can make 
mistakes. He refers to the Princess 
Patricia's Regiment, for example. 
and suggests that Militia regiments 
made up half the 1st Canadian 
Division in 1939 and militia 
soldiers half the personnel strength 
of the division. Not so. when the 
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Permanent Force, not all of which 
was in the lst Division, numbered 
only 4.500. He says that 
Montgomery commanded two 
Canadian corps in 1941-2, again 
incorrect, and he perhaps strains 
a bit to suggest that Canadian and 
British formations were all but 
interchangeable. More seriously 
than these minor slips, Reynolds 
says nothing about the RCAF and 
RCN who had their own tens of 
thousands serving in Britain. 
Still, this is a splendid book, a 
model of comparative history that 
is based on wide-ranging primary 
source research. Charles Stacey 
and Barbara Wilson wrote the book 
on Canadians in Britain, but 
Reynolds has demonstrated that by 
bringing the Americans into 
equation (in much the largest way, 
of course). the worth of this kind 
of history can be increased greatly. 
J.L. Granatstein 
York University 
(J.L. Granatstein is co-author. with 
Desmond Morton of Victor!) 1945.) 
* * * * * 
TheU-Boat 
Hunters 
Marc Milner,The U-Boal Hunters: 
771e Ro!:Jal Canadian Navy and the 
QtJensive against Germany's 
Submarines (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 1994) $35.00. 326 
pages. (ISBN 0-8020-0588-8). 
I n this companion book to North Atlantic Run. Marc Milner takes 
an in depth look at the second half 
of the U-Boat war. and the 
involvement of the Royal Canadian 
Navy in the Allied victory. Milner 
biie!1y recaps the dismal state of the 
RCN in early 1943. and then takes 
the reader through the political, 
administrative. tactical, and 
technical advances made during 
1944-1945. Although this latter 
half of the Atlantic war has been 
traditionally shunned by 
historians, Milner's careful 
research uncovers the incredible 
advances made by both the Allies 
and the Germans in the 'art' of 
submarine warfare. From the 
German Navy Acoustic Torpedo 
(GNAT), to the Canadian Anti-
Acoustic Torpedo gear (CAT), and 
the British FOXER, the reader is 
introduced to the nuances of Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASWJ in the 
Second World War. 
This book remains, however, 
an account of the Canadian 
contribution to the victory at sea. 
As with his earlier work. North 
Atlantic Run, Milner is not 
uncritical of the manner in which 
it was conducted. With the success 
of the convoy system finally 
assured, "hunter-killer" groups 
were formed to specifically destroy 
submarines. Zones of 
responsibility were established, 
which saw the United States Navy 
with its carrier-based groups. 
taking a larger share of the 
responsibility. In some cases, this 
marginalized the Canadian effort. 
There were many different 
reasons for this occurrence, not the 
least of which was the unavailability 
of modem equipment for Canadian 
use. Certainly the aspirations of 
Admiral Percy Nelles and the 
professional navy for its postwar 
fleet. were partly to blame. Other 
reasons have a basis in decisions 
not to pursue the construction of 
more advanced types of escorts, 
such as the superb Castle-class 
corvette. The abortive Canadian 
designed RX/C radar was yet 
another set back. A sensitive unit, 
it worked very well, when it worked. 
but its maintenance requirements 
were such that it was impractical 
for active duty. 
With the arrival of long range 
patrol (LRPJ aircraft such as the B-
24 Liberator. and the availability of 
better 10 em radar sets, the nature 
of the Atlantic war was drastically 
changing by late 1944. Ships 
equipped with type 144 I 45 sonar, 
and the "Q" attachment, as well as 
the more advanced type 14 7B 
sonar, made identifying a 
submarine in open water easier. 
This resulted in the Escort Groups 
achieving a much higher success 
rate against U-Boats. However, the 
problem of identifying a submerged 
submarine in shallow inshore 
waters. persisted throughout the 
war. Situations such as the 
"layering" of water due to differing 
temperatures played havoc with 
accurate identification. Therefore 
spring and fall became the best 
times for sub-hunting. The 
technology of bathythermography 
was developed in an attempt to 
combat this situation, and was 
marginally successful. Other 
methods were developed to tackle 
the threat of the U-Boat such as 
hunts to exhaustion. These so 
called "salmon operations" were 
organized in an effort to kill elusive 
U-Boats, but usually resulted in the 
vast expenditure of explosives with 
little to show. 
Canadian support groups had. 
by wars end, become quite adept 
at sinking U-Boats; and what makes 
this achievement remarkable was 
the fact that it was accomplished 
almost solely by the volunteer navy. 
As Milner suggests, the professional 
navy was concerned with postwar 
careers, and the accumulation of 
fleet destroyers, cruisers, and 
aircraft carriers. But he never lets 
the reader forget that the Canadian 
Navy's primary responsibility was 
the safe escort of convoys; 
something which was accomplished 
with great success, under the most 
dire of circumstances. 
In the end, The U-Boat Hunters 
is presented as a well-researched 
account of the late war activities of 
the RCN. A "good read," it is 
supported by maps. photographs, 
comprehensive notes. and a listing 
ofU-Boat kills by the RCN from May 
1943 to May 1945. This volume is 
a welcome addition to Milner's first 
book North Atlantic Run, and 
should be enjoyed by the Naval 
fraternity and the general public 
alike. 
Rob Bromley 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
* * * * * 
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